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Growing Manufacturing T rade and Investment
between Africa and China 
Trade between China and Sub-Saharan Africa has grown
over 100-fold since 1990. Although there has been much
focus on China’s interest in securing supplies of natural re-
sources from Africa, trade in the manufacturing sector is also
growing dramatically (see figure 1). 
This trade is also opening the door to increasing direct
investment in manufacturing on the continent, as Chinese
exporters look to supply African markets and take advantage
of low-cost labor. A potentially important channel for this
investment is through industrial parks or SEZs. In 2006, the
Chinese government announced that it would support the
establishment of as many as 50 overseas “economic and
trade cooperation zones.” Of the 19 zones approved so far,
5 are in Sub-Saharan Africa: in Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria
(two), and Zambia.2 (See table 1 for a description of the
zones.) 
Weak Industrial Competitiveness in Africa
and Relatively Poor Experience with 
Zones to Date 
Accelerating industrialization is critical for African countries
to reduce poverty and meet their Millennium Development
Goals. Most of the continent remains stuck in established
trading  patterns  that  rely  on  exports  of  raw  materials.
African industries have largely struggled to reach scale and
to compete in global markets: firms in Africa are almost 20
percent less competitive than firms in other regions (World
Economic Forum, World Bank, and African Development
China’s recent moves to establish special economic zones (SEZs) in several African countries can make a significant
contribution to industrialization in Africa. But the success of these projects is by no means guaranteed. Meeting the
objectives of both China and African countries will require an active partnership and a framework for collaboration
that includes engagement from host governments, processes for phasing-in local control, communication and
enforcement of standards, and support for integration with local economies.Bank 2009). Factors that contribute to weak industrial com-
petitiveness include lack of policy stability, poor infrastruc-
ture, and high indirect costs related to a poor business
environment.
SEZs offer a combination of world-class infrastructure,
expedited customs and administrative procedures, and (usu-
ally) fiscal incentives that overcome barriers to investment
in the wider economy. SEZs have been used successfully in
many developing countries (particularly in East Asia) to fa-
cilitate competitiveness, foster export-oriented production,
and  promote  wider  economic  reforms.  Although  some
African countries—notably, Mauritius, and to a lesser extent,
Kenya and Madagascar—have had success with zones, many
of the problems that plague the wider investment environ-
ment in Africa have also hindered development of most SEZ
projects on the continent (FIAS 2008). These problems in-
clude infrastructure shortfalls, administrative weaknesses, in-
effective management, policy uncertainty, and poor strategic
and operational planning. 











































Figure 1. Total Trade between Africa and China, 1990–2008 
Source: COMTRADE via WITS.
Note: Data illustrate the total value of exports from China to Sub-Saharan
African countries plus the total value of imports into China from Sub-
Saharan African countries.
minerals and fuels manufactures
Table 1. Overview of Trade and Economic Cooperation Zones in Africa Approved by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
Total  Start of 
Country and zone investment Size planning Status Chinese developers Industry focus
Zambia, Chambishi US$410 11.58 km2 2003 In operation  China Nonferrous Metal Copper and copper mining–
(7.98 km2);  and construction Mining Group related industries
start-up 2.00 km2
Zambia, Lusaka Subzone 5 km2 Not Construction China Nonferrous Metals  Garment, food, appliances,
available Corporation  tobacco, and electronics
Nigeria, Lekki US$254 30.0 km2; first 2003 Construction China Civil Engineering  Transportation equipment,
million for phase 10.0 km2; Construction, Jiangning  textile and light industries,
2–3 years; start-up 3.5 km2 Development Corp.,  home appliances, and
Y 2.52 billion Nanjing Beyond, China telecommunications
(US$369 Railway
million total)
Nigeria, Ogun Y 1.5 billion 100.0 km; first Early  Construction Guangdong Xinguang,  Construction materials 
(US$220 phase 20.0 km2; 2004 South China Developing  and ceramics, ironware, 
million) for start-up 2.5 km2 Group furniture, wood processing,





Mauritius, originally Y 1.5 billion 2.11 km2; start-up 2006–07 Construction Shanxi-Tianli Group,  Manufacturing (textile, 
Tianli but renamed  (US$220 0.75 km2 Shanxi Coking Coal  garment, machinery, high-
Jinfei million) for Group, Taiyuan Iron  tech), trade, and living and 
first phase; and Steel Company service (tourism, finance)
US$720 
Ethiopia, Oriental Y 690 million 2 km2; start-up  2006–07 Construction Yonggang (quit), Qiyuan  Electric machinery, steel 
(eastern) (US$101 1 km2, with 10 km2- Group, Jianglian  and metallurgy, and
million reservation area International Trade,  construction materials
Yangyang Asset Manage-
ment, Zhangjiagang Free
Trade Zone (not a
shareholder)Why Might China Be Different?
There are several reasons to believe that Chinese SEZ proj-
ects in Africa might succeed where others have failed. First,
China is the world’s foremost success story in using SEZs as
a tool for attracting foreign direct investment and promoting
export-oriented industrialization. Starting in 1979, with the
establishment of 4 SEZs in the southeastern coastal region
of China,3 the country has established more than a 100
zones of various kinds. These zones have become one of the
principal means by which the Chinese government at local,
provincial, and national levels provides preferential policies
to foster the development of technology and industry. China
learned from the experiences of the Republic of Korea and
Singapore, and experimented with different zone models
across the provinces. Over time, China’s national and provin-
cial governments and its private zone developers have built
up substantial expertise in planning, developing, and oper-
ating SEZs.
Second, the effort to establish the zones in Africa is part
of an important Chinese government initiative, the aim of
which is as much political as it is economic. In 2006, the
Chinese government announced that it would establish as
many  as  50  overseas  “economic  and  trade  cooperation
zones.” These serve several economic objectives as part of
China’s “going out” (zou chuqu) strategy: increasing demand
for Chinese-made machinery, reducing trade frictions and
formal barriers imposed on Chinese exports to Europe or
North America, assisting China’s domestic restructuring by
sending mature industries offshore, and creating economies
of scale for overseas investment. But in the process of trans-
ferring one element of China’s own industrial development
success to other developing countries, the zones play an im-
portant political role as part of China’s extension of “soft
power” on the continent. As such, there is great political
pressure to ensure that these projects succeed. This pressure
can be seen, for example, in President Hu Jintao’s interven-
ing to move forward the project in Mauritius and his pre-
siding at the opening ceremony of the Chambishi Zone in
Zambia.
Third, the high-profile nature of this initiative has trans-
lated into a package of generous financial and nonfinancial
support for the zone projects from the Chinese government.
The Ministry of Commerce established a competitive tender
process for zone projects, under which winning bids are el-
igible to receive incentives that include grants, long-term
loans of as much as Y 2 billion (US$294 million) and subsi-
dies to cover up to 30 percent of some preparation costs, re-
bates on interest for Chinese bank loans, and diplomatic
support in working with host governments.4 The China-
Africa Development Fund (a fund of US$5 billion set up by
the Chinese State Council) has taken equity shares in three
of the zones. Some Chinese provinces offer additional in-
centives. China is also offering increasingly preferential trade
terms for African countries: at the 2007 Forum for China-
Africa Cooperation, China extended duty-free access to 440
products for African least-developed countries; at the 2009
forum, it announced an extension of this access to 95 per-
cent of products.5 The combination of incentives and trade
preferences may open up significant opportunities for Chi-
nese firms to use African zones as an export platform back
into the Chinese market.
Finally, despite the substantial government incentives, the
Chinese zones in Africa are profit-driven initiatives, led by
private sector consortia (although many of the lead firms are
national or provincial state-owned enterprises). The Chinese
government designed the program to ensure that developers
have a profit motive because they view this as critical to en-
sure sustainability. This is in line with international experi-
ence,  which  suggests  that  private  sector  SEZs  tend  to
operate more effectively than government-led zones; in
Africa, however, such private sector projects have been rare
(FIAS 2008). All the zones are being developed by Chinese
consortia, sometimes in joint ventures with local interests,
as in Nigeria and Zambia. (In Ethiopia and Mauritius, there
is  no  local  partner.)  Experienced  operators  of  China’s
SEZs—Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area,
Nanjing Jiangning Development Zone, and Zhangjiagang
Free Trade Zone—are involved in several African zones. 
Projects Are Still in Their Infancy , But Many
Challenges Have Arisen
China’s initiative to develop SEZs in Africa is still in its very
early days. Of the five zones, only the Chambishi Zone in
Zambia6 is operating. The SEZs in Nigeria (Lekki Free Zone
and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone) and Mauritius are
in relatively advanced stages of construction, and the Ori-
ental Zone in Ethiopia remains in the planning stages. To
date, some high-level knowledge sharing and training of local
managers has taken place; but local employment, supply
chain links, and technology transfer remain limited. As of
November 2009, the most advanced zone—Chambishi in
Zambia—has attracted 11 companies and US$760 million
in investment, with 5 additional companies expected in
2010. It employs about 4,000 workers (80 percent of whom
are local). However, most of the 11 companies invested thus
far are subsidiaries of the developer China Nonferrous Metal
Mining Group (CNMC) and already were present in 2006.
Moreover, of the 4,000 workers employed, only 600 are in
the zone itself, with the majority in the mines or at other
CNMC subsidiaries.7
Although it is premature to draw any conclusions, it is
clear that some positive progress is evident but its pace is
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cess is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, these projects not
only face many of the typical difficulties that afflict large
infrastructure projects, particularly in Africa; they also
must confront additional issues of cross-cultural commu-
nication, governance, political factors, and power relation-
ships. (See box 1 for an example of the challenges faced in
one project.)
Based on their experience at home, Chinese developers
expect host governments to actively support zone develop-
ment; instead, they are finding in some projects (such as in
Ethiopia) that governments allocate land to developers and
do little else. Developers have also been frustrated by the lack
of progress or poor quality of infrastructure provided by
some local governments outside the zones. In addition, many
of the projects have faced difficulties related to land acquisi-
tion and compensation. Although these issues have normally
been the responsibility of host governments, they have con-
tributed to project delays and friction with the local com-
munities (Lekki is an example). Finally, although the political
situations in the countries hosting zones are generally stable,
abrupt policy changes and conspicuous gaps between de jure
policy and de facto implementation have been problematic.
Chinese companies have found that promises of services like
“one-stop shops” can fail to materialize (for example, in
Ethiopia). Even when express registration of investments has
been set up, obtaining licenses and work permits has caused
delays (in Nigeria and Zambia, for example).
African governments and civil societies also have raised
concerns on a number of levels. One of the biggest issues re-
lates to lack of transparency and poor communication. Al-
though governments are privy to the contracts signed for
these zones (in most cases), the contracts have not been
published. This lack of transparency is not problematic only
for civil society, but also contributes to misunderstandings
among the partners themselves (see box 1). Some of these
problems relate to language. For example, at one of the
zones, African officials report that relationships improved
when their Chinese partners brought in a couple of high-
level officials who were fluent in English. Some African of-
ficials also worry that Chinese companies may use the zones
to bring in Chinese goods for re-export with African labels
into areas where African exports receive special incentives,
and to enter local markets without paying duties (as has
been an issue in Sierra Leone). The use of Chinese rather
than local materials and labor also has been a concern in cer-
tain projects (such as the one in Mauritius). Chinese nation-
als also tend to take most of the management and technical
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Box 1. The Lekki Free Zone in Nigeria
Nigeria’s Lekki Free Zone (being developed by a consortium of
Chinese investors1 in partnership with the state government of
Lagos) is perhaps illustrative of some of the challenges facing
both sets of partners in executing joint-venture SEZs in Africa.
The project, an ambitious effort to create a “model city” on 30
square kilometers just east of Lagos, has been in the planning
stage since 2003. Although it has made significant progress,
and initial investors are expected to be in place in the first half
of 2010, the development path of the project has faced many
obstacles along the way. Among those obstacles are these:
• Financing constraints and partnership disputes—Con-
struction was delayed for a period because of financial
constraints on the part of the Chinese consortium; this
apparently was linked to a dispute over partnership terms
within the Chinese consortium.
• Miscommunication over partnership terms—The Niger-
ian partner expected the Chinese consortium to deliver
its share of investment in capital, whereas the Chinese
partners expected to deliver it in-kind through infrastruc-
ture development. In addition, there have been concerns
from the Chinese partners about infrastructure responsi-
bilities of the Nigerian partner (for example, access to
the gas for the power plant). Chinese partners also have
raised concerns over the Nigerian partner’s potential to
ensure that the enabling policies critical to the success
of the zone actually will be implemented by the Nigerian
federal authorities.
• Local community disputes—Local communities around
the project protested over resettlement terms, the con-
struction of utility lines through their communities, and
the employment of Chinese workers for construction. This
protest caused project delays and resulted in transferring
5 percent of the Nigerian partner’s shares to the local
community. In addition, negotiations resulted in increas-
ing employment opportunities for workers from local
communities.
Note
1. The Chinese investors are CCEC-Beyond Consortium, led by
the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation.positions, at least in the initial project stages. For unskilled
jobs, concerns about wages and working conditions have
been raised—although most of these concerns are theoreti-
cal at this early stage of development. Finally, there are con-
cerns  that  the  zones  will  become  Chinese  enclaves,
unconnected with the rest of the domestic economy. Al-
though all the zones are open to any foreign and (with the
exception of the Mauritius zone) domestic investors, and
there is no explicit preferential treatment given to Chinese
investors, the reality to date in most of the zones is that in-
vestor interest has come primarily from Chinese companies.
Thus, in the absence of proactive efforts to promote inte-
gration, Chinese enclave zones are a real risk.
A Collaboration Framework to Support 
Win-Win Partnerships
The practice of partnering to develop of SEZs is part of a
long-term process of strategic engagement between Africa
and China. It offers a significant opportunity to contribute
to job creation, industrialization, and poverty reduction in
the region. To fulfil this potential, however, the projects
must be successful from business, social, and environmental
perspectives. Such success will require a partnership frame-
work that includes the following elements: 
1. High-level commitment and active engagement from host
governments—As noted earlier, China itself learned
many aspects of SEZ management through building
zones  with  overseas  partners.  These  lessons  were
widely applied throughout China’s SEZs, and they
have become common practice today. African govern-
ments have been less strategic at managing the projects
as learning experiences. Few of the governments par-
ticipate actively in the management of the projects or
have set up specific programs aimed at developing
SEZ expertise over the long term. Assigning specific
individuals (preferably Mandarin-speaking people) to
work with Chinese development teams can help, as
can high-level participation on boards. 
2. Phasing-in local control—China’s experience with Sin-
gapore followed a phased model where Singapore in-
terests held control for the first stage of the project,
and then Chinese interests took over. In the African
zones, Chinese companies have been granted conces-
sions of 50–99 years, and there appears to be no clear
plan for phasing-in local control when local manage-
ment has mastered the zone skills. It is sometimes a
difficult balance, because too much local involvement
can hinder the operational processes in the early stages
before skills, trust, and understanding have developed
between the partners. Having a systematic plan to
gradually increase local management and shareholding
can help ensure ongoing learning, while maintaining
efficiency.
3. Ensuring the provision of good-quality off-site infrastruc-
ture–Worldwide,  getting  zones  off  the  ground  has
proved difficult partly because of infrastructure inade-
quacies (power, roads, water, and sanitation). Public-
private partnerships or other models, such as independ-
ent power producers, are options that can accelerate this
development, bringing employment and other benefits
online earlier. Involving the local private sector, in addi-
tion to Chinese investors, will be critical.
4. Communicating and enforcing standards—Local job cre-
ation, environmental sustainability, and labor standards
all depend on African governments enforcing existing
standards and regulations. It may help to have these
standards and regulations translated into Mandarin, as
Mozambique has done for its labor regulations.
5. Implementing programs to promote links with domestic
markets—African countries will not profit from the
dynamic benefits of SEZs without ensuring closer links
between the (mostly Chinese) foreign investors in the
zones and the domestic private sector. Supplier devel-
opment programs and initiatives to help local compa-
nies set up operations inside the zones can play an
important role in creating these links. The recently an-
nounced funding from the Chinese government to
support African small and medium enterprises and
plans to help these enterprises invest in the zones
could provide a foundation for improving links.
6. Transparency and community relations—When con-
tracts and agreements for these important zones are
not made public, suspicion can fester. For the zones to
be sustainable, they need to have buy-in from local
communities. These communities need to understand
the nature of the agreements. In the Lekki project, for
example, transferring 5 percent of the shares of the
Nigerian consortium to the local community was one
way to address some of the local concerns.
Notes
1. This Economic Premise is based on a more detailed
note on the subject produced by the authors in December
2009. It is available from the International Trade Depart-
ment of the World Bank. To request a copy, please send an
email to tfarole@worldbank.org.
2. China’s definition of “Africa” includes the entire con-
tinent, not just the sub-Saharan portion. Under China’s def-
inition,  two  additional  zone  projects  are  ongoing  in
Africa—in Algeria and Egypt. In addition, there are other
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any “official” support from the government (for example, in
Botswana, Sierra Leone, and South Africa). 
3. A fifth zone was added later on Hainan Island.
4. As reported in the 2008 document from the Ministry
of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance, “Temporary
methods to manage the development funds for overseas eco-
nomic cooperation zones.” These were, however, defined as
“tentative” in the document; and the actual incentives pack-
age being executed has not been confirmed by the Ministry
of Commerce.
5. This enhanced access would be phased in, starting at
60 percent in 2010.
6. The Chambishi Zone is a mining and minerals-process-
ing project that began in 2003. A subzone of Chambishi, de-
signed for traditional light manufacturing industries, is now
under planning and construction near Lusaka.
7. The mining activities and the CNMC subsidiaries are
not technically considered part of the zone.
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